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On	the	Narrative	Form	of	Simulations	
Studies	in	History	and	Philosophy	of	Science,	62	(2017),	74-85	M.	Norton	Wise,	Department	of	History,	UCLA		
Abstract.	Understanding	complex	physical	systems	through	the	use	of	simulations	often	takes	on	a	narrative	character.	That	is,	scientists	using	simulations	seek	an	understanding	of	processes	occurring	in	time	by	generating	them	from	a	dynamic	model,	thereby	producing	something	like	a	historical	narrative.	This	paper	focuses	on	simulations	of	the	Diels-Alder	reaction,	which	is	widely	used	in	organic	chemistry.	It	calls	on	several	well-known	works	on	historical	narrative	to	draw	out	the	ways	in	which	use	of	these	simulations	mirrors	aspects	of	narrative	understanding:	Gallie	for	“followability”	and	“contingency”;	Mink	for	“synoptic	judgment”;	Ricoeur	for	“temporal	dialectic”;	and	Hawthorn	for	a	related	dialectic	of	the	“actual	and	the	possible”.	Through	these	reflections	on	narrative,	the	paper	aims	for	a	better	grasp	of	the	role	that	temporal	development	sometimes	plays	in	understanding	physical	processes	and	of	how	considerations	of	possibility	enhance	that	understanding.		
An	Exemplary	Simulation--Snowflakes		 In	a	previous	paper	I	have	considered	several	simulations	of	physical	processes	and	have	argued	that	in	important	respects	they	exhibit	properties	of	historical	narratives,	or	more	specifically	natural-historical	narratives.	That	is,	they	“explain”	(as	practitioners	of	simulation	sometimes	say)	the	processes	they	simulate	by	generating	them	as	a	development	in	time,	an	evolution	or	unfolding	from	a	
	 2	beginning	scenario	to	an	ending.	A	brief	summary	of	one	of	those	cases	will	establish	some	basics	for	continuing	the	discussion.	The	case	concerns	snowflakes.1		As	part	of	his	work	on	pattern	formation	in	complex	systems	(here	nonlinear,	nonequilibrium,	dynamical	systems),	the	physicist	Kenneth	Libbrecht,	began	studying	snowflakes.	Contrary	to	the	traditional	expectation	that	they	should	exhibit	highly	symmetric	geometrical	forms,	he	already	knew	that	they	nearly	always	exhibit	asymmetries	and	irregularities,	conforming	rigorously	to	no	simple	pattern.		Using	high	resolution	equipment	Libbrecht	obtained	photomicrographs	of	both	naturally	occurring	and	artificially	grown	snowflakes,	revealing	their	characteristics	in	unprecedented	detail.	In	2006	he	published	what	he	called	a	Field	Guide	to	
Snowflakes.	Libbrecht’s	Field	Guide	and	his	extensive	website	contain	an	amazing	diversity	of	natural	forms.2	The	term	“field	guide”	signals	already	that	he	takes	the	subject	of	pattern	formation	in	snowflakes	to	be	one	of	natural	history.	He	writes	further	of	snowflakes	in	terms	of	their	“life	history”	and	of	constructing	their	“story.”	In	brief,	the	growth	of	an	individual	snowflake	is	to	be	understood	in	the	terms	of	a	unique	historical	narrative.		This	narrative	quality	in	Libbrecht’s	remarks	continues	further	in	the	work	of	two	of	his	occasional	collaborators.	While	he	makes	photomicrographs	of	real	snowflakes,	they	do	simulations,	with	comparable	resolution	(figure	1).	In	“Modeling	Snow-Crystal	Growth,”	the	mathematicians	Janko	Gravner	and	David	Griffeath	have	produced	a	computational	model	that	replicates	many	of	the	basic	forms	or	“habits”	of	snowflakes—dendrites,	needles,	prisms,	etc.—along	with	their	more	intricate	“traits”—sidebranches,	sandwich	plates,	hollow	columns,	and	a	variety	of	surface	effects—ridges,	flumes,	ribs,	circular	markings,	and	other	more	
	 3	chaotic	patterns.3	Ironically,	given	this	level	of	detail,	their	simulations	produce	only	symmetric	crystals.	That	is	an	artifact	of	the	program.	To	reduce	computer	time,	it	generates	only	one-half	of	one	arm,	which	is	then	reflected	around	a	central	axis	in	twelve	identical	half-arms.		
	 		 Gravner	and	Griffeath	model	snowflake	growth	at	the	mesoscopic	level,	that	intermediate	realm	between	microscopic	molecules	and	macroscopic	appearances,	where	neither	quantum	mechanics	nor	classical	mechanics	provides	an	approach	directly	from	general	principles.	Instead,	the	model	grows	a	virtual	snowflake	from	a	small	“seed”	crystal	by	successive	addition	of	tiny	hexagonal	prisms.		The	crystal	is	
	 4	imagined	to	be	surrounded	by	water	vapor	and	its	growth	is	governed	by	only	three	phenomenological	considerations:	diffusion	of	water	vapor	from	the	crystal;	freezing	and	melting	in	a	narrow	boundary	layer;	and	attachment	rates	at	the	boundary	favoring	concavities.	Despite	this	conceptual	simplicity,	however,	implementation	of	the	model	in	a	continually	updating	cellular	automaton	requires	many	parameters	and	therefore	large	amounts	of	computing	time.	The	evolution	of	a	single	snowflake	takes	about	24	hours	on	a	modern	desktop	computer,	even	though	restricted	to	full	symmetry.		 Gravner	and	Griffeath	forthrightly	acknowledge	that	it	is	not	very	clear	just	how	their	intuitively	plausible	parameters	correlate	with	physical	processes	and	that	their	simulations	do	not	yet	treat	important	issues	of	non-symmetry,	randomness,	singularities,	and	instabilities,	that	is,	the	full	range	of	contingencies	that	affect	growth.	They	nevertheless	believe	that	their	limited	evolutionary	simulations	provide	an	understanding	of	many	of	the	characteristics	of	natural	snowflakes,	both	in	general	morphology	and	in	the	details	of	their	traits.4	Run	many	times	over,	with	varying	parameters,	the	simulations	explore	the	space	of	possible	snowflakes	and	their	probable	mechanisms	of	formation.	These	explorations	also	“discover”	new	properties,	in	the	sense	that	they	reveal	features	that	might	be	found	in	real	snowflakes.	They	thereby	suggest	new	kinds	of	observations,	which	could	probe	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	the	model.	 	The	known	properties	and	new	discoveries	obtained	in	the	snowflake	simulations	are	natural	historical	in	kind.	Key	terms	are	trait,	habit,	morphology,	
seed,	evolution,	field	guide.	The	simulations	generate	a	kind	of	taxonomy	of	
	 5	snowflakes	in	which	the	traits	of	the	different	varieties	are	understood	through	the	simulated	history	of	their	development	in	time,	read	as	evolution	(figure	2).				
This	evolution	derives	from	a	simple	generative	model	operating	under	varying	environmental	conditions.	That	is,	the	simulations	generate	an	evolutionary	narrative	that	grows	snowflakes	as	products	of	a	development	in	which	every	individual	emerges	uniquely	from	its	temporal	path.	If	fully	developed,	this	history	would	follow	a	tiny	ice	crystal	falling	for	an	hour	or	more	through	the	contingencies	of	a	turbulent	atmosphere	to	acquire	its	final	intricate	form.	Libbrecht	draws	the	basic	lesson:	“Complex	history;	Complex	crystal	shape.”	Complexity	and	historicity	are	deeply	entwined.		 While	more	explicitly	natural-historical	than	other	examples,	this	snowflake	generation	nevertheless	provides	a	fairly	typical	case	of	model-based	simulations	of	complex	physical	processes,	of	their	relation	to	historical	narrative,	and	of	their	value	for	scientific	understanding.	Although	I	will	limit	my	discussion	here	to	
	 6	complex	systems,	I	do	not	think	that	limitation	is	essential.	Rather,	the	narrative	properties	tend	to	be	effaced	when	deductive	mathematical	systems	are	available.	I	take	such	deductive	systems	to	be	a	subset	of	the	more	general	form	of	narrative,	obtained	from	it	by	idealization	and	abstraction.	Although	often	obscured,	the	virtues	of	narrative	knowing	retain	their	potency.		 One	further	aspect	of	the	snowflake	story	requires	immediate	notice.	It	depends	crucially	on	visualization	to	make	it	legible.	That	is	not	a	matter	simply	of	illustration.	Rather	visualization	is	the	only	effective	means	for	following	the	growth	process.	To	be	understandable	the	simulation	must	incorporate	visualization	software	for	converting	its	calculations	into	an	object	accessible	to	the	senses.	Ideally,	the	software	would	show	the	evolution	in	a	continuous	movie.	That	goal	will	bring	me	to	the	simulation	on	which	I	will	focus	below,	discussion	of	which	will	help	to	deepen	the	role	of	temporality	in	narrative	understanding.	But	first	a	few	general	comments	on	the	relation	of	model-based	simulations	to	narrative.		
Models	and	Narratives		 I	begin	from	two	broad	observations.	The	first	is	that	natural	scientists	today	are	much	more	likely	to	appeal	to	models	to	ground	their	claims	to	understanding	and	explanation	than	they	are	to	appeal	to	natural	laws.	The	difference	is	rather	fundamental	in	that	the	strength	of	the	appeal	to	natural	laws	has	often	rested	on	the	implicit	assumption	that	the	laws	are	“out	there,”	in	nature,	and	not	a	product	of	human	contrivance.	An	archetype	is	Laplace’s	System	of	the	World	(1795),	unified	by	the	inverse-square	law	of	gravitation,	along	with	his	conception	of	a	being	knowing	all	the	laws,	and	therefore	knowing	simultaneously	all	past	and	future	states	of	
	 7	every	atom	in	the	universe.	Models,	on	the	other	hand,	typically	carry	the	sense	of	things	that	we	build	and	modify	for	our	own	purposes	of	understanding	and	action.	Models	are	exploratory	and	provisional.	They	are	limited	in	scope	rather	than	universal	and	they	typically	work	by	analogy	rather	than	necessity.	And	they	are	more	likely	to	take	up	real-world	contingencies.	These	properties	lead	to	a	second	observation,	that	the	practice	of	using	models	to	explore	the	world	tends	to	bring	with	it	a	more	nearly	narrative	mode	of	understanding.	The	link	between	these	two	observations	may	be	that	narratives	too	are	our	constructions,	designed	to	interrelate	a	limited	range	of	materials	within	a	coherent	context	to	yield	a	meaningful	interpretation.	When	coupled	with	models,	the	narratives	tell	us	how	the	models	work	and	how	they	relate	to	the	world.5		 If	so,	then	the	narrative	aspects	of	model-based	simulations	may	have	much	more	in	common	with	historical	narratives	than	has	usually	been	assumed.	An	exemplary	expression	from	Paul	Ricoeur’s	now-classic	Narrative	and	Time	(1984)	will	suggest	how	deeply	the	change	in	viewpoint	cuts.	In	commenting	on	the	role	of	contingency	and	complexity	in	history,	Ricoeur	sharply	contrasted	historians	with	his	conception	of	physicists,	relying	on	the	view	then	current	that	physicists	aim	to	eliminate	contingencies	by	appeal	to	laws.	[Historians]	do	not	expect	them	[laws]	to	eliminate	contingencies,	but	rather	to	provide	a	better	understanding	of	their	contribution	to	the	march	of	history.	This	is	why	their	problem	is	not	to	deduce	or	to	predict	but	to	understand	better	the	complexity	of	intertwinings	that	have	converged	into	the	occurrence	of	this	or	that	event.	In	this	historians	are	different	than	physicists.6	
	 8	But	are	they?	If	“complexity	of	intertwinings”	is	precisely	what	some	physicists	and	other	natural	scientists	want	to	understand	through	model-based	analysis,	then	we	ought	to	expect	that	they	will	behave	more	like	historians.	And	they	do.		 From	this	perspective,	a	broad	field	opens	for	fresh	consideration	of	how	narratives	function	in	modeling,	whether	in	the	natural	sciences	or	social	sciences.	I	aim	to	show,	in	fact,	that	important	aspects	of	what	has	been	said	about	the	properties	of	narrative	by	philosophers	of	history	like	Ricoeur	–	looking	aside	from	their	views	on	science	–	apply	also	to	some	model-based	simulations.	I	will	be	arguing,	for	example,	that	contingencies	often	play	a	crucial	role	in	the	understanding	of	physical	processes	that	some	simulations	provide.	More	generally,	the	use	of	models	to	explore	the	world	and	experiment	on	it	often	makes	contingencies	explicit	and	thereby	deepens	understanding.7		 Finally,	I	will	focus	my	discussion	of	the	narrative	form	of	simulations	on	the	role	of	time.	Not	all	simulations	and	not	all	narratives	have	a	primarily	temporal	form,	as	will	be	evident	from	other	papers	in	this	special	issue	(Morgan,	&	others).	Nevertheless,	I	want	to	show	that	the	experience	of	temporal	development	or	unfolding	is	critical	for	scientists’	understanding	of	the	simulated	physical	processes	that	I	describe	and	that	the	way	they	make	sense	of	these	temporal	simulations	reflects	key	aspects	of	narrative.	The	question	of	temporality	has	long	been	at	the	center	of	productive	debate	among	analysts	of	historical	narrative.	Does	understanding	come	from	following	the	story	prospectively	toward	an	ending	or	does	it	come	from	retrospective	reflection	on	what	has	already	happened?	I	consider	first	the	virtues	of	the	prospective	view,	then	important	aspects	of	retrospective	judgment,	and	finally	a	dialectical	perspective	on	their	interrelation.		
	 9		
Following	the	Story	In	2012	the	chemist	Kendall	Houk	published	his	inaugural	article	for	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences,	in	which	he	and	his	collaborators	presented	simulations	of	so-called	Diels-Alder	reactions,	first	described	by	Otto	Diels	and	Kurt	Alder	in	1928,	for	which	they	were	awarded	the	Nobel	Prize	in	1950.	These	are	some	of	the	most	important	reactions	used	in	organic	synthesis.	They	involve	two	reactants	forming	two	carbon	bonds	to	yield	a	six-membered	ring.	Figure	3	shows	the	product	of	butadiene	reacting	with	ethylene,	which	is	the	example	on	which	I	will	concentrate.			
Debate	over	the	mechanism	of	the	reactions	has	continued	ever	since	their	discovery,	focusing	especially	on	“the	timing	of	bond	formation,”8	which	is	also	my	focus	here.	The	basic	question	of	whether	the	two	C-C	bonds	form	simultaneously	or	serially	remained	unresolved.	As	usual	for	such	complex	systems,	a	direct	mathematical	solution	from	quantum	mechanical	foundations	was	not	possible.	Attempted	computational	solutions	remained	ambiguous	and	experiments	could	not	
	 10	directly	address	bonding	that	occurred	in	femtoseconds	(one	millionth	of	one	billionth	of	a	second).	Houk	and	his	team	sought	to	address	the	question	by	creating	high	resolution	simulations	of	the	process	in	time,	which	they	presented	as	movies.	These	simple	visual	narratives	form	a	key	component	of	the	published	paper,	for	they	present	the	findings	in	a	compelling	form.	And	like	all	good	stories,	they	draw	the	viewer	almost	irresistibly	into	the	experience	of	following	the	dynamic	vibrations	of	the	molecules	as	they	approach	one	another,	perhaps	recede,	and	approach	again.	To	appreciate	the	sense	of	expectancy	that	is	produced	requires	watching	the	action.	The	published	movies	are	available	at	this	link:	9	http://www.pnas.org/content/suppl/2012/06/26/1209316109.DCSupplemental.	Movies	S1	to	S3	are	for	the	reaction	of	butadiene	with	ethylene.	A	voiceover	might	give	the	plot	summary	as	follows.	In	the	beginning	two	molecules	that	feel	an	initial	attraction	begin	to	approach	one	another	in	a	tantalizing	dance,	with	all	of	their	atoms	in	motion	and	seeming	to	explore	a	coupling	that	may	or	may	not	occur.	They	form	a	first	bond	between	two	of	their	carbon	atoms	and	then	continue	the	dance	about	one	another,	sometimes	exceedingly	briefly,	sometimes	much	longer,	before	the	final	denouement	when	they	form	a	second	C-C	bond.	So	ends	the	story	of	a	Diels-Alder	reaction	in	its	usual	form.	At	normal	temperatures	(2980	K	or	250	C)	the	succession	of	the	two	bonds	for	most	reactions	turns	out	to	be	so	fast	that	they	are	essentially	simultaneous	(approximately	5	femtoseconds,	or	5	millionths	of	one	billionth	of	a	second),	while	at	high	temperatures	(about	11000	K)	and	for	non-symmetric	reactions,	some	trajectories	involve	an	intermediate	formation	(a	biradical)	and	the	interval	can	be	much	longer	(800	fs	or	more).		
	 11		 In	an	interview,	Kendall	Houk	described	the	function	of	these	apparently	so	simple	movies	within	a	professional	scientific	publication.		”This	paper	is	hard-core	physical	chemistry,	using	molecular	dynamics	techniques	to	study	the	Diels-Alder	reaction	in	detail	to	understand	how	it	happens.	We	conducted	a	time-resolved	study	of	how	these	reactions	happen	by	creating	simulations,	basically	movies,	of	molecules	coming	together	and	reacting.	The	idea	is	to	understand	how	the	reaction	happens,	not	just	that	a	goes	to	b	and	b	goes	to	c,	but	to	actually	follow	how	the	bonds	are	forming	and	how	the	atoms	are	moving	as	these	things	come	together.	Using	the	massive	computer	power	we	have	now,	we	get	a	degree	of	resolution	of	the	mechanism	[in	time]	that	was	not	really	possible	before.	It	takes	a	lot	of	computer	time,	but	as	a	result	we	now	have	unprecedented	insight	into	how	this	reaction	occurs.”10	The	movies	are	not	just	pretty	pictures	and	not	just	fascinating	to	watch;	they	are	integral	to	the	understanding	achieved	in	this	piece	of	“hard-core	physical	chemistry.”	Their	great	value	lies	in	the	temporal	account	they	give	of	the	process	of	bond	formation,	here	literally	to	see	it	happening	in	a	movie.	According	to	Houk,	it	is	this	capacity	to	actually	follow	the	motions	in	time	that	brings	“unprecedented	insight.”			 In	his	emphasis	on	following	the	process,	the	practicing	chemist	here	highlights	what	a	well-known	philosopher	of	history	identified	long	ago	as		an	essential	feature	of	narrative:	followability.	In	Philosophy	and	the	Historical	
Understanding	(1964),	William	B.	Gallie	analyzed	the	concept	at	length.	That	he	supposed	he	was	showing	“why	historical	understanding	[of	human	action]	must	
	 12	differ	in	kind	from	the	understanding	that	is	the	goal	of	the	sciences”11	now	appears	rather	ironic,	since	much	of	his	discussion	of	followability	would	seem	to	apply	to	model-based	simulations	in	the	physical	sciences.	And	in	fact,	Gallie	himself	in	his	2nd	edition	disavowed	his	former	insistence	that	historical	narrative	depended	essentially	on	its	appeal	to	individual	human	action	and	human	interest,	recognizing	“the	clear	fact	that	in	a	good	deal	of	cultural	history—histories	of	the	arts	and	the	sciences	and	of	technologies	and	all	’pre-history’—the	required	story-worthy	individuals	are	not	to	be	found.”12	Replacing	them	with	story-worthy	molecules	does	little	to	vitiate	several	aspects	of	followability	that	Gallie	highlighted.		One	such	aspect	is	the	reader’s	sense	that	the	story	is	proceeding	toward	an	end	and	of	being	drawn	along	by	it.	A	similar	sense	of	expectation	becomes	remarkably	strong	when	watching	the	Diels-Alder	movies.	As	is	said	of	narratives,	they	connect	together	a	chain	of	events	not	simply	as	a	sequence	but	as	a	natural	unfolding	guided	by	an	implicit	telos,	a	development	within	which	the	viewer	is	looking	toward	an	ending,	typically	the	double	C-C	bond,	but	then	perhaps	not!	Thus	the	narrative	has	a	purposive	quality	that	is	built	into	its	structure.	But	the	results	it	yields	(or	reveals)	regarding	the	bonding	process	and	bonding	time	are	not	ones	that	could	be	deduced	or	predicted	on	the	basis	of	the	starting	point	and	any	general	conditions	governing	change.		 This	unpredictability,	according	to	Gallie,	is	another	key	aspect	of	narratives,	which	gain	much	of	their	power	from	the	way	in	which	they	incorporate	contingencies	that	appear	along	the	way.	Such	contingencies	inhere	in	every	historical	situation	and	every	historian	encounters	them	in	doing	the	research	that	ultimately	enters	the	narrative	they	write.	The	challenge	for	the	historian	is	to	give	
	 13	full	recognition	to	these	contingencies	and	to	the	surprises	they	yield,	while	nevertheless	including	them	coherently	in	the	development	that	leads	to	the	ending.	This	effort	will	be	successful,	in	Gallie’s	terms,	just	in	case	the	reader	finds	the	contingencies	“acceptable”	within	the	narrative	and	with	respect	to	the	ending.	They	cannot	derail	the	narrative	nor	can	they	appear	from	nowhere.	They	must	be	acceptable	for	the	followability	of	the	story.	Almost	every	incident	in	a	story	requires,	as	a	necessary	condition	of	its	intelligibility,	its	acceptability,	some	indication	of	the	kind	of	event	or	context	which	occasioned	or	evoked	it,	or,	at	the	very	least,	made	it	possible.	This	relation,	rather	than	the	predictability	of	certain	events	given	the	occurrence	of	others,	is	the	main	bond	of	logical	continuity	in	any	story.13	For	the	Diels-Alder	movies	as	well	as	the	evolution	of	snowflakes	I	have	called	this	relation	a	natural	“unfolding.”	The	term	is	one	that	Gallie	sometimes	used	and	that	several	of	the	authors	in	this	volume	have	also	adopted.	It	leaves	open	the	question	of	causal	analyzability	under	laws	while	preserving	the	requirement	that	earlier	developments	establish	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	later	ones.	In	philosophy	of	science	there	is	a	burgeoning	literature	that	treats	such	unfolding	under	the	name	of	“mechanism.”	Although	I	will	not	pursue	it	here,	it	seems	promising	for	evolutionary	simulations.	(See	Crasnow’s	discussion	in	this	issue.)		The	issue	of	causality	emerged	for	Gallie	not	because	he	thought	causes	do	not	exist	in	history	but	because	there	are	too	many	of	them	and	they	are	irretrievably	entangled,	as	in	“the	convergence	of	the	different	kinds	of	causal	lines	that	met	at	Sarajevo	in	1914,”	such	that	they	do	not	constitute	“a	single	comprehensive	causal	system.”	He	called	such	systems	“complex,“	without	yet	
	 14	knowing	that	the	same	term	was	already	coming	to	characterize	a	wide	range	of	physical	systems	in	the	“sciences	of	complexity”	and	their	exploration	in	“dynamical	systems	theory”	(Libbrecht’s	field	of	physics).14	Although	the	two	meanings	of	complexity	differ	in	technical	terms,	the	results	of	interest	here	are	much	the	same:	complex	systems	are	sensitive	to	many	sorts	of	contingencies	that	affect	their	unfolding	and	make	it	unpredictable	in	detail.	They	require	for	their	followability,	therefore,	an	approach	that	is	less	reductive	and	less	deterministic	than	deduction	from	causes	governed	by	laws.	Historians	typically	find	this	versatility	in	narratives	while	physical	scientists	often	use	simulations	based	on	models	that	mirror	observed	complexity	and	capture	relevant	contingencies.	The	parallels,	I	am	arguing,	are	extensive.		
Enriching	the	Narrative			 In	attempting	to	explicate	what	it	is	about	narrative	history	that	yields	trustworthy	knowledge,	Gallie	distinguished	understanding,	obtained	directly	by	following	the	narrative,	from	explanation,	which	for	him	came	into	play	when	the	narrative	seemed	to	lose	its	followability	and	required	supplementary	support	or	clarification.		Historical	understanding	is	the	exercise	of	the	capacity	to	follow	a	story,	where	the	story	is	known	to	be	based	on	evidence	.…	But	to	follow	an	historical	narrative	always	requires	the	acceptance,	from	time	to	time,	of	
explanations	which	have	the	effect	of	enabling	one	to	follow	further	….	15	Gallie	was	here	attempting	to	distinguish	narrative	from	deductions	and	from	other	explanatory	material,	which	he	regarded	as	scientific	in	form	and	as	“ancillary”	with	
	 15	respect	to	the	priority	of	the	narrative	itself.	Since	this	dichotomous	mode	of	distinguishing	narrative	from	science	is	not	viable,	neither	is	Gallie’s	formulation	of	the	distinction	of	understanding	from	explanation.	Nevertheless,	his	discussion	raises	an	important	point.	The	basic	story	in	a	historical	narrative	does	not	stand	on	its	own.	It	relies	on	a	great	deal	of	supporting	information	and	analysis	that	both	explicates	the	narrative	and	deepens	its	meaning.	For	works	of	history,	the	enrichment	appears	partly	in	the	introduction,	partly	in	expository	sections	of	the	main	text,	and	partly	in	the	footnotes.	A	similar	enrichment	accompanies	the	Diels-Alder	movies	as	visual	narratives	of	chemical	bond	formation.	They	require	a	detailed	description	of	the	model	and	of	how	the	simulation	works,	including	its	development	in	time,	so	much	so	that	these	technical	discussions	constitute	the	main	body	of	the	text.	They	provide	an	elaborated	verbal	and	graphical	account	of	aspects	of	what	the	movies	show	in	a	consolidated	fashion.	In	contrast	to	Gallie,	I	will	simply	treat	this	“explanatory”	material	as	an	integral	part	of	the	full	narrative,	which	I	now	summarize.		 Houk’s	presentation	begins	with	a	literature	review,	which	positions	the	new		analysis	in	relation	to	previous	work,	followed	by	a	summary	of	what	will	be	shown	
	 16	through	the	movies.	An	extended	discussion	follows	of	the	starting	point	for	the	simulations,	the	so-called	transition	state	through	which	the	system	must	pass	in	order	to	reach	stable	bonding.	Figure	4	shows	the	configuration	at	the	middle	of	this	transition	state,	where	the	distance	between	C-C	bonds	is	2.27	Angstroms.	Though	fairly	narrow	in	energy,	the	transition	state	is	relatively	broad	in	terms	of	bonding	distances	for	the	two	C-C	bonds	and	thus	includes	a	spectrum	of	starting	geometries	for	the	two	reactants.	For	each	run	of	the	simulation	–	and	each	corresponding	movie	that	could	be	made	–	a	specific	starting	point	within	the	transition	state	is	selected	by	random	sampling	from	a	distribution	of	possible	positions	and	velocities.	The	distribution	itself	is	obtained	by	quasi-classical	techniques	to	yield	an	approximation	to	a	quantum-mechanical	probability	distribution.	It	is	just	here,	within	the	random	selection	of	starting	points,	that	the	variability	of	the	process	enters	along	with	its	unpredictability.			 From	the	beginning	scenario	of	starting	points,	the	narrative	of	the	process	of	bonding	proceeds.	I	give	it	in	a	simplified	form	but	with	enough	detail	to	indicate	how	the	full	narrative	is	constructed.	Four	images	(figures	5-8	below),	all	referring	to	the	particular	reaction	of	butadiene	with	ethylene,	will	suffice.16			 	
	 17		 For	each	of	the	selected	starting	points,	the	simulation	generates	a	unique	bonding	history,	which	could	be	depicted	in	its	own	movie.		To	follow	the	histories	more	deeply,	however	(and	in	the	manner	of	Gallie’s	explanatory	material),	the	Houk	team	explores	specific	aspects	of	them	as	“trajectories”	of	the	C-C	bonds,	focusing	on	bonding	distance.	The	bundle	of	threads	in	Figure	5	shows	these	bond	trajectories	for	the	butadiene-ethylene	example,	for	which	the	two	bonds	are	symmetric.	
Figure	5	
	Each	sinuous	thread,	running	from	top	right	to	bottom	left,	plots	on	the	horizontal	and	vertical	axes	the	distances	between	carbon	atoms	for	the	two	forming	bonds.	The	complicated	vibrations	of	all	of	the	other	atoms	of	the	reactants,	
	 18	which	would	appear	in	the	full	movie	for	any	one	of	these	threads,	are	taking	place	in	the	background,	so	to	speak.	Each	trajectory	actually	consists	of	two	parts,	computed	in	forward	and	backward	directions	from	the	transition	state	(the	dark	region,	consisting	of	dots	at	the	starting	points).	Thus	“forward	and	reverse	trajectory	simulations	from	the	same	initial	geometry	give	the	complete	trajectory	that	connects	reactants,	transition	state,	and	product.”17	As	the	trajectories	pass	through	the	transition	state	they	proceed	toward	the	small	square	area	at	bottom	left,	where	both	bond	distances	are	less	than	1.5	Angstroms	(10-8	cm)	and	the	bonds	have	formed,	ending	the	histories.	Taken	together,	the	full	bundle	of	these	complete	trajectories	(numbering	either	128	or	256)	gives	a	fairly	comprehensive	view	of	the	full	range	of	possible	bonding	histories	for	the	reaction,	including	occasional	outliers.		
Figure	6	
	
	 19	Figure	6	gives	a	set	of	complementary	plots	in	the	time	dimension,	showing	how	the	distance	for	either	one	of	the	two	symmetric	C-C	bonds	decreases	with	time	as	the	reactants	pass	through	an	appropriately	defined	“transition	zone”	(shaded).	Since	the	slope	of	the	curve	gives	the	velocity	of	approach,	the	trajectories	show	how	the	velocity	decreases	and	then	increases	again	while	passing	through	the	transition	zone.		
Figure	7	
	Even	more	dramatically,	Figure	7	plots	the	relative	approach	velocity	of	the	two	bonds	as	a	function	of	the	bond	distance	for	one	of	them.	The	individual	curves	display	wide	oscillation,	while	the	median	velocity	(solid	dark	curve)	highlights	an	expected	sharp	dip	through	the	transition	zone	followed	by	rapid	acceleration	as	the	bond	forms.	The	trajectories	also	reveal	the	interesting	fact	that	the	relative	velocity	sometimes	turns	negative	within	the	transition	zone.		
	
Figure	8	
	 20	
	Finally,	figure	8	plots	potential	energy	as	a	function	of	bond	length.	From	the	wildly	oscillating	individual	trajectories,	curves	for	median	values	extract	a	marked	hump	in	potential	energy	across	the	transition	zone,	while	the	curve	for	kinetic	energy	shows	a	corresponding	dip.	The	median	curves	for	the	bundles	of	trajectories	thus	depict	the	energy	barrier	that	the	reactants	must	surmount	in	order	to	complete	their	bonding.	It	will	be	apparent	that	the	four	graphic	depictions	of	reaction	trajectories,	figures	5-8,	along	with	their	verbal	descriptions,	give	technical	specificity	to	key	aspects	of	the	temporal	process	of	bond	formation	and	its	variability.	They	thereby	enhance	the	followability	of	the	narrative	as	it	would	be	presented	in	the	movie	of	any	one	of	the	specific	trajectories,	in	the	sense	that	they	allow	an	interrogation	of	the	movie	that	would	not	be	possible	by	simply	watching	it	directly.	What	they	do	not	supply,	and	the	movie	does,	is	the	capacity	“to	actually	follow	how	the	bonds	are	forming	and	how	the	atoms	are	moving	as	these	things	come	together,”	which	is	what	Kendall	Houk	identified	as	the	source	of	“unprecedented	insight	into	how	this	reaction	occurs.”	This	relationship	between	the	experience	in	time	that	the	movie	
	 21	affords	and	the	analytic	specification	of	key	features	of	its	technical	content	is	what	gives	the	full	narrative	its	power	for	understanding.18			 	
Synoptic	Judgment		 Another	important	perspective	on	the	power	of	narrative	is	that	of	Louis	Mink	whose	probing	essays	from	the	1960s	and	70s	are	collected	in	his	Historical	
Understanding	(1987).	Like	Gallie,	Mink	was	concerned	to	show	how	historical	understanding	differed	from	natural	science	as	conceived	in	the	deductive	theoretical	mode	(n.2)	and	he	hit	on	an	attractive	idea.	Unlike	historians,	he	thought,	scientists	could	detach	their	results	from	the	evidentiary	arguments	that	supported	them,	so	that	these	results	could	be	used	by	others	in	subsequent	analysis	and	in	different	contexts	in	a	cumulative	fashion.	(This	property	he	took	to	be	“possible	in	science	because	–	and	only	because	–	of	its	[deductive]	theoretical	structure,”	which	already	suggests	a	severe	limitation	of	the	argument	when	a	deductive	theory	is	not	available,	as	in	most	complex	systems.)	In	contrast,	Mink	argued	that	historians’	conclusions	were	“ingredient”	to	the	narrative	that	contained	them,	meaning	that	they	could	not	be	detached	from	it	while	maintaining	their	meaning,	because	“their	meaning	refers	backward	to	the	ordering	of	evidence	in	the	total	argument.”19	Again,	“The	narrative	is	not	a	story	supported	by	evidence,	but	the	statement	of	the	evidence	itself,	organized	in	narrative	form	so	that	it	jointly	constitutes	the	unique	answer	to	specific	questions.”20		This	distinction,	however,	seems	to	be	overdrawn	for	practitioners	in	either	domain,	whether	in	history	of	natural	science,	and	to	be	more	a	matter	of	degree	and	of	purpose	than	of	detachment	altogether.	For	example,	the	conclusion	from	the	
	 22	Diels-Alder	simulations	that	the	time	between	C-C	bonds	is	on	the	order	of	5	fs	is	surely	a	detachable	finding.	Equally	detachable	are	the	median	values	for	energy	barriers	and	for	the	percentage	of	reactions	that	proceed	through	an	intermediate	formation	(below).	But	those	numbers	are	bare	abstractions	from	a	narrative	whose	broader	aim	is	to	convey	an	understanding	of	how	the	reaction	proceeds.	And	chemists	concerned	with	that	understanding	of	the	temporal	process,	including	those	who	want	to	understand	how	the	reaction	will	function	in	their	own	attempts	at	synthesis,	will	have	to	watch	the	movies	repeatedly	while	also	studying	the	bundles	of	highly	variable	trajectory	plots	that	follow	specific	aspects	over	the	whole	course	of	the	reaction.	In	this	sense,	there	is	no	understanding	of	the	simulated	process	that	is	detachable	from	the	simulations.	So,	to	the	degree	that	the	conclusions	of	historical	narratives	are	non-detachable,	so	too	are	those	of	the	simulations,	for	they	provide	effectively	a	historical	narrative	of	the	reactions.			 However	one	judges	the	non-detachability	claim,	Mink	associated	with	it	another	holistic	conception	of	historical	narrative	of	great	importance.	In	crafting	his	narrative	the	historian	aims	to	organize	a	complex	interplay	of	events,	actions,	and	contexts	in	such	a	way	that	they	hang	together	in	a	coherent	interpretive	synthesis.	This	capacity	Mink	originally	labeled	“synoptic	judgment.”	“The	suggestion	is	that	the	distinctive	characteristic	of	historical	understanding	consists	of	comprehending	a	complex	event	by	‘seeing	things	together’	in	a	total	and	synoptic	judgment	which	cannot	be	replaced	by	any	analytic	technique.”21	He	soon	realized	that	this	narrative	mode	of	comprehension	needed	to	be	distinguished	more	carefully	from	other	modes	of	comprehension,	which	also	consisted	of	grasping	things	together	in	a	single	mental	act.	Most	pertinent	here	is	Mink’s	distinction	of	
	 23	the	theoretical	mode,	characteristic	of	natural	science	in	his	conception,	from	what	he	now	called	the	configurational	mode,	characteristic	of	(but	not	limited	to)	historical	narrative.	In	the	theoretical	mode	one	grasps	together	a	set	of	objects	under	a	general	law.	Thus	“iron	rusts”	and	“paper	burns”	become	instances	of	a	type	of	chemical	reaction	understood	theoretically	as	oxidation.	By	contrast,	in	the	configurational	mode,	a	letter	burning	would	be	comprehended	within	a	single	complex	of	relationships	–	a	friendship,	a	misunderstanding,	a	change	of	plans	–	perhaps	constituting	a	narrative.22		 With	respect	to	the	Diels-Alder	simulations,	it	would	certainly	be	possible	to	conceive	them	in	the	theoretical	mode	as	instances	of	a	generalization	(though	not	of	the	deductive	law	form)	about	the	dynamics	of	a	certain	class	of	reactions	(concerted	cycloaddition	reactions),	and	in	fact	that	is	part	of	Houk’s	mode	of	reporting	them.23	But	it	is	by	no	means	the	most	important	part.	Much	more	prominent,	as	I	have	stressed	above,	is	his	emphasis	on	understanding	the	process	as	a	whole,	described	more	nearly	in	the	configurational	mode.	He	apparently	seeks	to	“grasp	together,”	in	Mink’s	terms,	the	entire	bonding	process	in	a	single	thought.	Thus	the	movie,	supplemented	by	the	graphical	plots	(figures	5-8)	elaborating	aspects	of	it,	depicts	a	complete	history,	with	a	definite	narrative	structure	of	beginning	(reactants	attracting),	middle	(movement	through	the	transition	state),	and	end	(stable	bond).	As	thus	visualized,	the	single	thought	–	bonding	–	includes	within	it	the	entire	history.	(Indeed,	as	developed	further	below,	it	includes	the	whole	set	of	possible	histories	for	each	reaction.)	This	conception	of	configurational	comprehension	I	take	to	be	a	critically	important	feature	of	simulations	conceived	as	narratives.	
	 24		 What	now	becomes	important	to	consider	is	that	the	Diels-Alder	simulations	as	Houk	presents	them	are	preeminently	about	the	temporal	dynamics	of	the	bonding.	So	the	grasping	together	in	a	single	thought	is	the	grasping	together	of	a	development	in	time	as	a	single	thought.	The	question	is	whether	time	in	this	act	of	“seeing-things-together”	is	actually	important	to	understanding.	To	this	question,	Mink	answered	with	an	unequivocal	no;	and	yet	time	seems	to	be	crucial	to	Houk.	I	will	come	down	on	the	side	of	Houk,	but	first	a	bit	on	Mink’s	argument,	which	he	presented	most	forcefully	as	a	dismissive	critique	of	Gallie,	whose	stress	on	the	followability	of	a	narrative	he	thought	wrongheaded,	and	just	wrong.			 Understanding	a	historical	narrative,	according	to	Mink,	has	little	to	do	with	following	the	story	and	its	contingencies.	That	would	be	the	position	only	of	a	naïve	reader	who	did	not	already	know	the	ending.	No	historian	could	have	the	experience	of	contingent	events	being	made	acceptable	by	the	story	directing	them	toward	an	expected	but	open	conclusion.	“It	is	not	following	but	having	followed	which	carries	the	force	of	understanding.”	24	By	this	Mink	meant	that	one	understands	a	narrative	retrospectively,	not	prospectively,	for	it	is	only	in	retrospect	that	one	can	understand	the	significance	of	what	has	happened	at	any	point.	Furthermore,	it	is	only	in	retrospect	that	one	can	grasp	the	narrative	together	in	a	single	thought,	which	he	took	to	imply	that	the	temporal	order	of	the	events	that	it	incorporates	is	not	an	essential	feature	of	understanding.	The	“actions	and	events,	although	represented	as	occurring	in	the	order	of	time,	can	be	surveyed	as	it	were	in	a	single	glance	as	bound	together	in	an	order	of	significance.”25		This	conception,	with	qualifications,	has	much	to	recommend	it	for	the	Diels-Alder	simulations.	With	respect	to	figures	5-8,	for	example,	the	plots	of	the	
	 25	trajectories	of	bond	formation	can	literally	be	surveyed	at	a	glance	and	contemplated	in	their	entirety.	One	sees	the	whole	course	of	the	velocity	decreasing	through	the	transition	zone	and	the	full	shape	of	the	potential	energy	barrier	that	must	be	overcome.	But	does	this	capacity	for	retrospective	inspection	and	analysis	legitimate	Mink’s	more	radical	claim	that	the	overview	essentially	eradicates	temporality,	that	“in	the	understanding	of	a	narrative	the	thought	of	temporal	succession	as	such	vanishes”	so	that	“time	is	not	of	the	essence	of	narratives”?26			 Mink’s	most	extreme	formulation	of	this	claim	rested	on	the	idea	that	“the	human	project	is	to	take	God’s	place,”	where	God’s	knowledge	is	referred	to	Boethius’s	concept	of	the	totum	simul,	“in	which	the	successive	moments	of	all	time	are	copresent	in	a	single	perception,	as	of	a	landscape	of	events.”27	It	is	telling	that	Mink’s	references	for	this	notion,	with	respect	to	theoretical	comprehension,	were	Laplace	and	the	ideal	of	all-embracing	laws	of	nature	in	the	deductive	vision	of	scientific	knowledge.	That	is	of	course	the	vision	that	fails	for	complex	systems	and	for	which	simulations	from	models	now	offer	a	potent	alternative.	Even	with	respect	to	configurational	comprehension	Mink	took	the	timeless	totum	simul	to	be	the	highest	degree	of	comprehension.28	I	find	it	quite	difficult	to	reconcile	this	view	with	the	practices	of	those	simulators	who	model	the	evolution	or	unfolding	of	systems	in	time	as	their	source	of	understanding.	The	expression	of	this	unfolding	in	Houk’s	movies	provides	an	epitome.		
Temporal	Dialectic		I	do	not,	however,	want	in	any	way	to	undercut	the	retrospective	comprehension	that	Mink	so	effectively	highlights	as	synoptic	judgment	and	
	 26	configurational	comprehension,	quite	the	opposite,	but	rather	to	interrelate	it	with	the	prospective	sense	of	progression	toward	an	ending	that	Gallie	articulated	as	followability.	In	this	I	will	draw	on	Paul	Ricoeur,	who	in	Time	and	Narrative,	gave	extensive	reflections	on	“Defenses	of	Narrative,”	including	those	of	Gallie	and	Mink.	As	one	would	expect	from	his	title,	Ricoeur	took	Mink’s	claim	“that	time	is	not	of	the	essence	of	narratives”	to	be	a	self-defeating	denial	of	the	narrative	form	itself	as	a	mode	of	understanding.	He	found	this	denial	actually	expressed	in	Mink’s	totum	
simul	as	an	ideal,	for	it	would	have	no	place	for	the	sequential	form	of	narrative,	or	emplotment,	to	connect	together	the	complex	interrelations	of	the	world.29		Ricoeur	proposed	instead	that	narrative	always	involves	a	constant	interaction	between	two	dimensions	of	time,	which	correspond	to	the	emphases	of	Gallie	and	Mink.	It	involves	a	“temporal	dialectic”	between	an	“episodic”	dimension	(basically	a	temporal	sequence	of	events,	a	la	Gallie)	and	Mink’s	configurational	dimension.	The	plot	interrelates	these	two	dimensions	as	the	narrative	moves	along,	making	it	possible	to	follow	the	story	while	continually	grasping	it	together	in	a	kind	of	feedback	loop.	In	configurational	terms,	the	plot	“construes	significant	wholes	out	of	scattered	events,”	thereby	“eliciting	a	pattern	from	a	succession”	as	a	single	thought.30	But	episodic	time	is	not	thereby	abolished,	for	the	“single	thought”	encompasses	the	development	as	a	development	in	time.	Ricoeur’s	episodic/configurational	dialectic	can	be	captured	by	modifying	Mink’s	own	memorable	metaphor	of	two	views	of	a	river.	In	reflective	configurational	comprehension,	Mink	remarked,	“time	is	no	longer	the	river	which	bears	us	along	but	the	river	in	aerial	view,	upstream	and	downstream	seen	in	a	single	survey.”31	But	like	anyone	who	has	descended	a	turbulent	river	in	a	canoe,	Ricoeur	would	
	 27	surely	have	said	that	these	are	two	very	different	experiences	of	temporality,	and	that	their	interplay	is	necessary	to	understanding	river-time.	I	would	now	say	the	same	for	Kendall	Houk’s	trajectories	of	bonding,	as	well	as	for	snowflakes.		 The	Gallie-Mink	discordance	raises	a	further	major	issue	requiring	comment,	namely	the	role	of	contingency.	While	Gallie’s	forward-looking	perspective	welcomed	contingency	as	a	motor	of	historical	narrative,	Mink	viewed	the	historian	as	striving	to	eliminate	contingency.	With	respect	to	Gallie’s	remarks	on	the	complexity	of	causal	lines	leading	to	Sarajevo	and	the	inherent	contingency	of	what	happens,	Mink	responded:	“tracing	lines	backwards	is	exactly	what	an	historian	does,	and	there	are	no	contingencies	going	backwards	(if	there	were	there	would	be	no	lines).”32	Ricoeur	objected	to	this	reasoning	on	the	ground	that	historians	are	continually	rethinking	the	narratives	they	either	write	or	read	and	in	this	are	much	more	like	the	naïve	reader	than	Mink	allowed.	Thus	“the	process	of	tracing	forward	again	what	we	have	already	covered	going	backward	may	well	reopen	…	the	space	of	contingency	that	belonged	to	the	past	when	it	was	present.”33	I	would	argue	in	fact	that	it	is	precisely	the	job	of	a	good	historian	to	keep	the	“space	of	contingency”	open,	rather	than	to	close	it	down,	and	to	explore	the	possibilities	of	that	space.		It	seems	unlikely	that	to	“run	the	film	backward,”	as	Mink	suggested,	will	succeed	in	eliminating	the	importance	of	contingencies	in	understanding	complex	systems.	The	Diels-Alder	trajectories	and	movies	suggest	a	different	conception.	Granted,	running	any	one	of	the	movies	backward	will	take	the	viewer	through	precisely	the	same	movements	in	reverse.	But	every	rerunning	of	the	simulation	from	a	randomly	selected	starting	point,	mimicking	the	effect	of	contingencies,	produces	a	somewhat	different	history,	and	a	different	movie,	sometimes	quite	
	 28	different.	This	rerunning,	which	I	take	to	be	somewhat	analogous	to	the	rewriting	and	rereading	so	characteristic	of	historians,	is	one	of	the	important	ways	in	which	simulations	deepen	understanding	of	the	processes	they	model.		
Possibility	and	Exploration		 The	significance	of	this	rerunning	of	simulations	emerges	more	clearly	for	the	Diels-Alder	reactions	if	we	think	of	each	of	them	in	terms	of	the	whole	bundle	of	bonding	trajectories	that	represents	it	(here	standing	in	for	the	full	histories	that	could	be	shown	in	movies).	The	single	thought	of	bonding	then	encompasses	not	only	one	trajectory	but	all	of	the	trajectories	that	the	reactants	could	have	followed	through	the	many	different	randomly	sampled	starting	points.	The	effect	of	this	broader	comprehension	becomes	quite	striking	for	the	symmetric	reaction	of	butadiene	with	ethylene	depicted	in	figure	5	when	the	temperature	is	elevated	from	2980	K.	to	11800	K	as	in	figure	9A.	The	bundle	of	trajectories	is	now	much	more	tangled	and	irregular,	more	like	a	swarm.	A	significant	percentage	(such	as	those	stretching	out	to	the	right	along	the	bottom	of	the	plot)	go	through	a	different	mechanism,	an	intermediate	formation	(biradical),	which	leads	to	quite	long	time	gaps	between	the	two	C-C	bonds,	increasing	from	about	6	to	800	fs.	Movie	S3,	corresponding	to	one	of	these	trajectories,	gives	an	excellent	sense	of	why	they	are	so	tangled,	as	it	displays	a	dance	between	the	C-C	bonds	that	is	tantalizingly	long.	This	latter	mechanism	is	even	more	in	evidence	in	figure	9B	and	Movie	S5	for	a	different,	asymmetric,	reaction	simulated	at	the	lower	temperature,	with	time	gaps	over	1400	fs	(Movie	S5	at	http://www.pnas.org/content/suppl/2012/06/26/1209316109.DCSupplemental).		
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			 This	suggests	too	how	rerunnings	of	the	simulations,	as	represented	in	the	bundles	of	trajectories,	quite	literally	explore	Ricoeur’s	“contingency	space”	for	the	various	ways	in	which	the	reaction	could	proceed.	They	map	out	the	space	of	possibilities	as	real	developmental	possibilities	and	facilitate	the	grasping	together	in	a	single	thought	of	the	whole	process	of	bond	formation.34	To	put	the	point	a	bit	differently,	in	following	any	one	actual	bonding	history,	we	are	immediately	aware	of	its	place	among	other	possible	histories.	And	this	knowledge	of	the	possible	deepens	our	understanding	of	the	actual.	
	 30	An	analogous	relation	of	the	actual	to	the	possible	has	been	made	the	basis	for	a	penetrating	account	of	how	historical	explanation	is	related	to	understanding	by	the	philosopher	of	social	and	political	theory,	Geoffrey	Hawthorn,	in	his	Plausible	
Worlds:	Possibility	and	Understanding	in	History	and	the	Social	Sciences	(1991).35	It	turns	on	counterfactuals	and	on	what	he	calls	initially	a	paradox.	A	successful	historical	explanation,	on	Hawthorn’s	account,	connects	the	conditions	and	actions	of	actual	developments	with	other	actualities,	but	the	force	of	the	explanation	depends	on	its	implication	of	other	possible	developments	that	might	have	been	realized	but	were	not.		“Its	success	as	an	answer	to	the	question	‘why?’	will	turn	on	the	plausibility	of	the	reasoning	–	the	model,	mechanism,	or	what	J.	L.	Mackie	called	the	inductively	arrived-at	‘running	on’	–	that	we	invoke	to	make	the	connection.	The	plausibility	of	this	reasoning	will	turn	on	the	counterfactual	it	suggests.36	The	seeming	paradox	is	that,	in	connecting	actualities,	the	successful	explanation	opens	unrealized	but	realistic	possibilities,	and	it	is	just	in	this	opening	of	possibilities	that	understanding	is	located.	Houk’s	simulations	have	something	like	this	character.	The	credibility	of	any	one	actual	movie	or	trajectory	depends	on	its	place	within	the	entire	spectrum	of	possible	trajectories.	As	Hawthorn	said	of	history,	“It	promises	that	kind	of	understanding	.	.	.	which	comes	from	locating	an	actual	in	a	space	of	possibles.”	He	took	his	cue	here	from	Robert	Nozick	in	
Philosophical	Explanations	(1981),	who	suggested	that	“explanation	locates	something	in	actuality	.	.	.	while	understanding	locates	it	in	a	network	of	possibility.”	He	cited	also	an	astute	passage	from	Robert	Musil’s	Man	without	Qualities,	“If	there	
	 31	is	such	a	thing	as	a	sense	of	reality	…	then	there	must	be	something	that	one	can	call	a	sense	of	possibility.”	Things	might	really	have	been	different.	37	The	paradoxical	relation	of	explanation	to	understanding,	as	Hawthorn	presented	it,	began	from	the	view	that	historians	have	understood	explanations	as	providing	a	causal	account	of	a	sequence	of	particular	events,	an	account	that	aims	to	be	so	tightly	constructed	rationally	and	evidentially	that	it	is	irresistible,	explaining	away	contingencies	and	making	it	difficult	to	believe	that	any	alternative	development	was	possible.	He	summarized	this	view:	“however	the	world	may	appear	to	be	or	really	is,	to	understand	it	is	to	make	it	coherent.	The	coherence	is	ours	and	in	it,	the	loose	ends	of	mere	possibles	have	no	place.”	He	offered	a	paraphrase	of	Kierkegaard	that	recalls	Mink’s	view:	“Life	may	have	to	be	lived	forwards,	but	the	historian	is	privileged	to	understand	it	backwards.”38		Retrospective	explanations,	on	this	view,	exclude	the	counterfactuals	that	they	actually	imply	or	suggest,	for	to	every	cause	adduced	as	important	to	an	outcome,	if	that	cause	had	not	been	operative	the	outcome	would	have	been	different.	And	yet,	the	more	one	examines	the	particularity	of	the	apparent	causes	in	play	for	specific	situations	and	agents,	the	more	contingent	they	seem.	And	here	is	the	crucial	point:	“if	the	counterfactual	is	itself	not	plausible,	we	should	not	give	the	explanation	the	credence	we	otherwise	might.”39	So	even	as	the	pursuit	of	ever	more	detailed	explanation	hones	in	on	what	actually	happened,	the	nearby	possibilities	of	what	might	plausibly	have	happened,	but	did	not,	increase.	This	increase	is	where	understanding	lies,	it	“comes	from	locating	an	actual	in	a	space	of	possibles.”		All	of	this	seems	quite	pertinent	for	both	cases	of	simulation	that	I	have	discussed,	in	each	of	which	actualities	and	possibilities	are	produced	within	the	
	 32	same	generative	model.	Whether	for	the	whole	taxonomy	of	snowflakes	or	the	bundles	of	trajectories	for	a	Diels-Alder	reaction,	the	simulations	quite	explicitly	explore	the	counterfactual	world	of	realistic	possibilities	in	order	to	gain	a	more	thorough	understanding	of	what	actually	happens	for	any	particular	snowflake	or	trajectory.	Whether	in	history	or	physical	science,	then,	explanation	(of	actualities)	and	understanding	(of	possibilities)	are	inherently	linked.	A	better	explanation	is	one	that	makes	the	nearby	alternatives	more	immediately	present	to	what	actually	happens	in	a	given	case.		Interestingly,	if	unsurprisingly,	Hawthorn’s	analysis	of	explanation	in	relation	to	understanding	ultimately	vitiated	the	conception	of	explanation	that	originally	stood	behind	his	discussion	as	a	foil,	namely,	the	view	that	it	is	causal	laws	and	general	theories	that	explain.40	Drawing	on	a	number	of	philosophical	critiques	of	the	idea	of	laws	said	to	be	laws	of	nature,	or	laws	in	the	world,	he	proposed	to	“forget	laws	altogether”	and	to	focus	on	a	different	conception	of	explanation.	It	is	a	pragmatic	conception	emphasizing	relativity	to	our	interests	and	purposes,	and	it	provides	an	answer	to	the	question	“why?”	as	a	narrative:	“it	tells	a	story	which	is	guided	by	contrasts	with	what	we	want	to	explain.	It	succeeds,	where	it	does,	by	giving	descriptions	which	in	the	conventions	of	telling	that	story	to	that	kind	of	audience,	are	relevant	as	explanations.”41	In	Hawthorn’s	plausible	worlds,	context,	contingency,	and	indeterminacy	are	the	features	that	have	to	be	assimilated	in	our	understanding	of	the	story.	For	this	purpose,	it	is	not	the	distinction	of	science	from	non-science	that	counts	(or	indeed	I	would	add,	of	explanation	from	understanding),	but	of	the	actual	from	the	possible,	since	“each	turns	on	the	other.”42	He	could	offer	no	new	name	for	this	dialectical	mode	of	understanding	but	it	will	be	apparent	that	
	 33	it	bears	a	close	relation	to	Ricoeur’s	episodic/configurational	dialectic,	for	which	it	provides	a	grounding	in	the	logic	of	counterfactuals.			
Conclusion	I	have	been	pursuing	an	understanding	of	the	role	of	temporality	in	simulations	of	physical	processes	in	complex	systems	by	taking	the	Diels-Alder	simulations	as	an	epitome	and	placing	some	of	their	specific	features	in	parallel	with	what	have	been	seen	as	definitive	characteristics	of	narrative	knowing.	1.)	Most	immediately,	Kendall	Houk’s	stress	on	being	able	to	directly	follow	the	process	of	the	reaction	in	a	movie	correlates	quite	closely	with	Gallie’s	emphasis	on	the	followability	of	a	narrative	through	its	contingencies.	2.)	Repurposing	Gallie’s	account	of	how	explanatory	material	ancillary	to	a	narrative	enhances	followability,	I	find	that	graphical	plots	of	specific	aspects	of	the	reaction,	extending	over	its	full	course	(bonding	distances,	bonding	distance	vs.	time,	velocities,	and	potential	energies)	greatly	enrich	understanding	of	what	the	movies	contain	in	consolidated	form.	3.)	These	same	graphical	plots	appear	to	give	a	clear	picture	of	what	Mink	meant	by	the	synoptic	judgment	and	configurational	comprehension	that	narratives	afford.	The	plots	provide	at	a	glance	overviews	of	the	entire	course	of	the	reaction,	ready	for	retrospective	analysis.	4.)	And	yet	Mink	went	too	far	in	eradicating	temporal	order	from	the	configurational	mode.	Ricoeur	reasserts	the	significance	of	time	in	an	episodic/configurational	dialectic	that	reopens	the	“space	of	contingency”	that	Mink	wanted	to	close.	The	relation	of	episodic	movies	to	configurational	trajectory	plots	in	the	Diels-Alder	simulations	captures	the	point	rather	well.	5.)	Hawthorn	similarly	reopens	the	key	role	of	contingency	in	his	analysis	of	the	
	 34	relation	of	the	actual	to	the	possible	in	the	understanding	that	historical	narratives	provide.	Analogues	for	this	relationship	can	be	seen	for	the	Diels-Alder	simulations	in	the	relation	of	any	single	actual	trajectory	to	the	entire	bundle	of	possible	trajectories	and	in	the	relation	of	the	more	direct	bonding	trajectories	to	those	through	intermediate	formations.		I	conclude	that	understanding	how	simulations	produce	knowledge	about	real	processes	in	complex	systems	benefits	greatly	from	recalling	basic	features	of	narrative	knowing.	I	conclude	also	that	thinking	in	terms	of	a	dialectic	between	following	and	configuring	illuminates	the	role	of	temporality	in	simulations	of	these	processes.		A	final	observation	from	Hawthorn	may	be	helpful.	As	an	illuminating	analogue	to	the	contingency	that	figures	so	prominently	in	historical	narrative,	he	offered	the	unrealized	possibilities	of	biological	evolution	and	the	improbability	of	the	species	we	know	to	exist	today.	This	was	a	topic	much-discussed	by	Stephen	J.	Gould	at	the	time.	Whether	or	not	one	wants	to	go	so	far	as	Gould	in	promoting	the	improbability	of	evolutionary	history,	the	contingency	of	particular	developments	is	apparent.43	The	evolutionary	corollary	has	seemed	quite	appropriate	also	for	the	simulated	natural	histories	of	snowflakes,	and	I	would	extend	it	as	well	to	the	Diels-Alder	reactions.	In	both	cases	it	is	the	capacity	to	follow	a	process	through	its	developmental	history,	or	to	follow	its	growth,	while	simultaneously	learning	to	recognize	diverse	alternative	possibilities,	that	yields	understanding.	
																																																									1	M.	Norton	Wise,	“Science	as	Historical	Narrative,”	Erkenntnis,	75	(2011),	349-376,	special	issue	on	What	Good	is	Historical	Epistemology,	ed.	Uljana	Feest	and	Thomas	Sturm.	I	have	relaxed	here	my	earlier	stress	on	how	simulations	often	“explain”	by	
	 35																																																																																																																																																																						growing	their	product	not	because	I	think	it	mistaken	but	in	order	to	avoid	confusion	with	the	senses	of	explanation	used	by	the	authors	I	cite	below	and	in	order	to	join	it	with	a	broader	conception	of	understanding.	See	n.	7	below.	2	K.	Libbrecht,	Field	Guide	to	Snowflakes	(St.	Paul:	Voyageur	Pr.,	2006).	Many	images	online	at	http://www.its.caltech.edu/~atomic/snowcrystals/	3	Janko	Gravner	and	David	Griffeath,	“Modeling	Snow-Crystal	Growth:	A	Three-Dimensional	Mesoscopic	Approach,”	Physical	Review	E,	79	(2009),	1-18	(color	images	online):	traits,	p.	1;	habits,	p.	17.		4	A	complaint	could	arise	here	that	the	model	of	growth	of	a	snowflake	from	hexagonal	prisms	does	not	represent	a	“true”	or	correct	quantum	mechanical	theory	of	the	interaction	of	water	molecules,	thus	obscuring	truth	even	while	aiding	understanding.	A	possible	response	could	be	that	the	prism	model	with	its	parameters	operates	at	the	mesoscopic	level	and	that	at	that	level	it	aims	to	give	a	true	theoretical	account.	Such	a	response	need	not	invoke	the	idea	of	a	merely	approximately	correct	model;	it	could	insist	instead	on	the	irreducibility	of	the	mesoscopic	description	to	a	microscopic	molecular	one.	An	interesting	possibility	for	such	a	claim	could	be	the	existence	of	quantum	“protectorates,”	or	mesoscopic	domains	in	which	characteristic	features	are	not	sensitive	to	changes	at	the	quantum	mechanical	level,	so	that	the	higher	level	description	is	as	“fundamental”	as	it	gets.	That	is,	there	may	be	nothing	about	snowflakes	considered	macroscopically	that	depends	on	a	microscopic	description.	On	protectorates	and	their	possible	relevance	to	“complex	adaptive	matter”	and	even	evolutionary	diversity	see	Robert	В.	Laughlin	and	David	Pines,	et	al.,	“The	Middle	Way,”	[Electronic	Version],	Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences,	97	(2000),	32-37.	5	The	best	recent	account	of	this	relation	is	Mary	S.	Morgan,	The	World	in	the	Model:	
How	Economists	Work	and	Think	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2012).	On	simulation	modeling	of	complex	systems	(but	without	narrative)	see	Johannes	Lenhard,	“The	Great	Deluge:	Simulation	Modeling	and	Scientific	Understanding,”	in	Henk	de	Regt,	Sabina	Leonelli,	and	Kai	Eigner	(eds.),	Scientific	Understanding:	
Philosophical	Perspectives	(Pittsburgh:	University	of	Pittsburg	Press,	2009),	169-186,	and	his	general	analysis	and	survey,	“Computer	Simulation,”	in	Paul	Humphreys	(ed.),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Philosophy	of	Science	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2015),	accessible	from	Oxford	Handbooks	Online	(www.oxfordhandbooks.com).		The	relation	of	models	and	narratives	is	a	theme	of	Angela	N.	H.	Creager,	Elizabeth	Lunbeck,	and	M.	Norton	Wise	(eds.),	Science	without	
Laws:	Model	Systems,	Cases,	Exemplary	Narratives	(Durham,	NC:	Duke	University	Press,	2007).		6	Paul	Ricoeur,	Time	and	Narrative,	trans.	Kathleen	McLaughlin	and	David	Pellauer,	3	vols.	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1984-1988),	I,	154.	Ricoeur	was	expressing	the	widespread	“Hempelian”	or	“Deductive-Nomological”	conception	of	scientific	explanation	as	requiring	deduction	from	general	laws,	identified	for	historians	with	the	oft-reprinted	paper	by	Carl	G.	Hempel,	“The	Function	of	General	Laws	in	History”	[1942],	in	C.	G.	Hempel	(ed.),	Aspects	of	Scientific	Explanation,	and	
Other	essays	in	the	Philosophy	of	Science	(London:	Macmillan,	1965),	232-243.	Most	
	 36																																																																																																																																																																						of	the	philosophers	of	history	discussed	below	also	understood	“science”	in	this	way.	Despite	its	drawbacks,	it	may	have	sharpened	their	reflections	on	narrative.	7	A	vexed	debate	lurks	here	over	the	meaning	of	understanding	versus	explanation.	I	will	be	attempting	to	lead	discussion	away	from	this	question	and	toward	a	more	liberal	view	of	understanding,	which	does	not	depend	on	the	dichotomy	(this	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	for	several	of	the	authors	I	cite	the	dichotomy	–	typically	in	Hempelian	form	–	was	immediately	present	to	their	thinking	about	narrative).	The	philosophical	literature	on	understanding	in	science	(rather	than	explanation)	is	growing,	but	so	far	it	is	thin	on	what	narrative	has	to	offer.	De	Regt,	et.	al.,	Scientific	
Understanding,	contains	many	useful	articles	on	the	meaning	of	understanding	in	a	wide	variety	of	sciences.	8	Kersey	Black,	Peng	Liu,	Lai	Xu,	Charles	Doubleday,	and	Kendall	N.	Houk,	“Dynamics,	Transition	States,	and	Timing	of	Bond	Formation	in	Diels-Alder	Reactions,”	Proceedings	of	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences,	109,	no.	32	(2012),	12860-12865,	on	12860.	http://www.pnas.org/content/109/32/12860.full	9	It	may	be	best	to	use	the	Chrome,	Safari,	or	older	Explorer	browsers,	or	download	to,	e.g.,	Windows	Media	Player.	If	unsuccessful	contact	nortonw@history.ucla.edu.	10	Interview	with	Beth	Azar,	“QnAs	with	Kendall	N.	Houk,”	Proceedings	of	the	
National	Academy	of	Sciences,	109,	no.	32	(2012),	12839.	My	emphasis.	11	W.	B.	Gallie,	Philosophy	and	the	Historical	Understanding	[1964],	2nd	ed.	(New	York:	Schocken	Books,	1968),	3.	Gallie,	like	Ricoeur	after	him,	followed	Hempel’s	characterization	of	natural	science	(n.	6).	12	Gallie,	Philosophy,	4.	13	Gallie,	Philosophy,	26.	14	Gallie,	Philosophy,	92-93,	118.	See	also	the	Ricoeur	quotation	of	n.	6.	15	Gallie,	Philosophy,	105.	My	emphasis.	16	All	of	the	figures	are	from	Black,	et.	al.,	“Dynamics”	and	its	Supplementary	Material.	http://www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1209316109/-/DCSupplemental	17	Black,	et.	al.,	“Dynamics,”	12862.	18	This	understanding	could	of	course	be	wrong,	if	the	simulation	does	not	in	fact	correspond	to	the	actual	dynamics	of	the	reaction,	but	that	is	difficult	to	judge	in	the	absence	of	direct	experimental	confirmation.	The	question	of	validity	then	becomes	one	of	consistency,	whether	with	respect	to	other	experimentally	confirmed	results,	to	the	successful	extension	of	the	results	in	a	chain	of	synthesis,	or	to	theoretical	considerations.	19	Louis	Mink,	“Autonomy	and	the	Historical	Understanding,”	History	and	Theory,	5	(1966),	24-47,	reprinted	in	Louis	Mink,	Historical	Understanding,	ed.	Brian	Fay,	I.	O.	Golob,	and	R.	T.	Vann	(Ithaca	and	London:	Cornell	U.	Pr.,	1987),	61-88,	esp.	79.	
	 37																																																																																																																																																																						20	Louis	Mink,	Mind,	History,	and	Dialectic:	The	Philosophy	of	R.	G.	Collingwood	(Bloomington:	Harper	&	Row,	1969),	193.	See	Paul	Roth’s	article	in	this	issue	for	the	significance	of	this	claim	and	his	development	of	it.	21	Mink,	“Autonomy,”	82.	22	Louis	Mink,	“History	and	Fiction	as	Modes	of	Comprehension,”	New	Literary	
History,	1	(1970),	541-548,	in	Mink,	Historical	Understanding,	42-60,	on	51-53.		23	Mink	considered	the	different	modes	of	comprehension	to	be	incompatible,	in	the	sense	that	they	could	not	be	combined	in	a	single	act.	He	offered	only	anecdotal	evidence.	He	did	acknowledge	that	one	could	select	different	modes	as	appropriate	to	a	particular	inquiry.	Mink,	“History	and	Fiction,”	551f,	in	Mink,	Historical	
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